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Abstract. We consider the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem, which is a unit-demand
auction where each bidder receives an item that maximizes his utility, and the goal is to
maximize the auctioneer’s profit. This problem is NP-hard and unlikely to be in APX. We
present four new MIP formulations for it and experimentally compare them to a previous
one due to Shioda, Tunc¸el, and Myklebust. We describe three models to generate different
random instances for general unit-demand auctions, that we designed for the computational
experiments. Each model has a nice economic interpretation. Aiming approximation results,
we consider the variant of the problem where the item prices are restricted to be chosen from
a geometric series, and prove that an optimal solution for this variant has value that is a
fraction (depending on the series used) of the optimal value of the original problem. So this
variant is also unlikely to be in APX.
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1 Introduction
A part of mechanism design is devoted to profit maximization. The fundamental problem of maxi-
mizing profit while selling multiple items to consumers has been vastly considered in the literature
and can be viewed as a type of auction. Hartline and Karlin [10, Chap. 13] provided an introduction
on this class of problems. The general goal is to determine a price for each item and an allocation
of items to consumers in a way that the overall profit of the seller is maximized. However, once the
prices are defined, the consumers may behave in several ways. In the literature, there are a vari-
ety of models (max/min-buying, rank-buying, max-gain-buying) [1] that try to capture the usual
behavior of consumers.
Guruswami et al. [7] formalized one such model, suggested by Aggarwal et al. [1], defining the
envy-free pricing for combinatorial auctions. In the more general setup, each bidder (consumer) is
willing to buy a bundle of items. Knowing the valuation of every bundle of items for each bidder,
the auctioneer (seller) has to decide on the pricing and on an allocation of the items to the bidders
in an envy-free manner, that is, in a way that any bidder is at least as happy with the bundle of
items assigned to him (that might even be empty) as with any other bundle of items, considering
the prices. The auctioneer’s goal is to maximize his profit. Of course, in this general form, there is
an issue on the amount of information involved, specifically for the valuations. So it is reasonable
to consider, as Guruswami et al., particular cases that avoid this issue.
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A well-studied case is the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem, in which each bidder is willing
(or is allowed) to buy at most one item, and there is an unlimited supply of each item. Guruswami
et al. presented a (2 lnn)-approximation for this problem, where n is the number of bidders, and
proved that this problem is APX-hard (with each bidder valuation being 1 or 2 for the items of
interest). Briest [3] further analyzed the hardness of approximation, considering the uniform budget
case, where each bidder equally values all items he is interested in. Assuming specific hardness of
the balanced bipartite independent set problem in constant degree graphs, or hardness of refuting
random 3CNF formulas, there is no approximation for the uniform budget unit-demand envy-free
pricing problem with ratio O(lgǫ n) for some ǫ > 0. Chen and Deng [4] showed that the unit-demand
envy-free pricing problem can be solved in polynomial time if every bidder has positive valuation
for at most two items.
More recently, Shioda, Tunc¸el, and Myklebust [11] described a slightly more general model than
the one of Guruswami et al. [7], and presented a mixed-integer programming (MIP) formulation for
their model, along with heuristics and valid cuts for their formulation.
1.1 Our Results
We present new MIP formulations for the unit-demand envy-free problem that can be adapted
also to the model described by Shioda et al. [11]. We compare these new formulations to the one
of Shioda et al. through computational experiments that indicate that our new formulations give
better results in practice than the other one.
For the computational experiments, we used six different sets of instances, obtained from
generators we designed. Leyton-Brown et al. [8] presented the well-known Combinatorial Auc-
tion Test Suite (CATS) generator, proposed to provide realistic bidding behavior for five real
world situations. See also [5, Chap. 18]. Their generator produces instances for auctions where
the bidders are interested in buying a bundle of items. A simple adaptation of CATS for unit-
demand auctions does not preserve the economic motivations. So we designed three models to
generate different random instances for unit-demand auctions, and we implemented three corre-
sponding generators. Each of the three models has a nice economic interpretation and can be
used in other works on unit-demand auctions, such as [9,11]. We believe these instances genera-
tors are a nice contribution by themselves, and we made them available as open-source software at
https://github.com/schouery/unit-demand-market-models.
The inapproximability result of Briest [3] indicates that the unit-demand envy-free pricing prob-
lem is unlikely to be in APX. In the search for an APX version of the problem, we considered a
variant in which the prices are restricted to assume only specific values (that forms a geometric
series with ratio 1+ǫ for a fixed ǫ > 0). We prove that any constant approximation for this variant is
a constant (depending on ǫ) approximation for the original problem. This implies that this variant
is also unlikely to be in APX. Yet, the connection between the two problems seems interesting. At
first, one can think that the relation is not surprising but, by changing even a bit the prices of the
items, an envy-free allocation may change dramatically, incurring in a big loss of profit. This result
however assures that the loss (in terms of optimal values) is within a constant factor.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present some notation and describe
formally the problem that we address. In Sect. 3, we present our new MIP formulations for the
problem and revise the one by Shioda et al. [11]. In Sect. 4, we present the three instances generators
and describe the economical motivation behind each one. In Sect. 5, we empirically compare our
formulations for the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem against the one by Shioda et al. [11],
using sets of instances produced by our generators. In Sect. 6, we consider the variant of the problem
with restricted prices and show that this variant is still hard to approximate, that is, if one would
find a constant factor approximation for this variant, then this approximation would also have a
constant factor for the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem. We conclude with some final remarks
in Sect. 7.
2 Model and Notation
We denote by B the set of bidders and by I the set of items.
Definition 1. A valuation matrix is a non-negative rational matrix v indexed by I ×B.
The number vib represents the value of item i to bidder b.
Definition 2. A pricing is a non-negative rational vector indexed by I.
Definition 3. A (unit-demand) allocation is a binary matrix x indexed by I ×B, such that, for
every bidder b, xib = 1 for at most one item i.
If xib = 1, we say that i is sold to b and b receives i. If xib = 0 for every item i, we say that b
receives no item. If xib = 0 for every bidder b, we say that i is not sold. Note that an allocation is
not necessarily a matching, as the same item can be assigned to more than one bidder (each one
receives a copy of the item).
Fix a valuation matrix v and a pricing p. The next definitions formalize the concept of an
envy-free allocation.
Definition 4. For an allocation x, the utility of a bidder b, denoted by ub, is vib − pi if bidder b
receives item i and 0 if bidder b receives no item.
Definition 5. For an allocation x, bidder b is envy-free if ub ≥ 0 and ub ≥ vib − pi for every
item i. We say that x is envy-free if every b in B is envy-free.
In other words, there is no item that would give a bidder a better utility. Now we are ready to
state the problem.
Definition 6. The unit-demand envy-free pricing problem consists of, given a valuation matrix v,
finding a pricing p and an envy-free allocation x that maximize the auctioneer’s profit, which is the
sum of the prices of items received by the bidders (considering multiplicities).
Fig. 1(a) illustrates an instance of the problem, and Fig. 1(b) shows an envy-free allocation x for
the pricing p = (5, 8, 3), where x12 = x13 = x31 = 1, while all other entries of x are 0. The profit of
the auctioneer in this case is 13. Note that this is not the best possible profit, as there is an envy-free
allocation for the pricing p = (6, 6, 3) that leads to profit 21 (take x13 = x22 = x24 = x31 = 1).
Given a valuation matrix v and a pricing p, it is easy to compute an envy-free allocation xp that
maximizes the auctioneer’s profit. Indeed, for each bidder b, assign to b an item i that maximizes
vib−pi (if that is non-negative), resolving ties by choosing the item with higher price (if ties persist,
there is more than one such allocation). Hence, to solve the problem, it is enough to find a pricing
p such that p and xp maximize the auctioneer’s profit.
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Fig. 1: (a) A valuation matrix represented by a weighted bipartite graph whose edge weights give the
non-null valuations. (b) An envy-free allocation, given by the darker edges, for the pricing shown
at the left of the items.
3 MIP Formulations
Before presenting the formulations, let us denote, for an item i, max{vib : b ∈ B} as Ri and, for
a bidder b, max{vib : i ∈ I} as Sb. These definitions will be used for “big-M” inequalities in the
formulations presented in this section. We start by presenting the formulation due to Shioda et
al. [11] slightly adapted to our problem. Consider a valuation matrix v.
We use the following variables: a binary matrix x indexed by I×B that represents an allocation,
a rational vector p indexed by I that represents the pricing and a rational matrix pˆ indexed by I×B
that represents the price paid for item i by each bidder b (that is, pˆib = 0 if b does not receive i and
pˆib = pi otherwise). The formulation, which we name (STM), consists of, finding x, p, and pˆ that
(STM) maximize
∑
b∈B
∑
i∈I
pˆib
subject to
∑
i∈I
xib ≤ 1, ∀b ∈ B
∑
i∈I\{k}
(vibxib − pˆib) ≥ vkb
∑
i∈I\{k}
xib − pk, ∀k ∈ I, ∀b ∈ B (1)
vibxib − pˆib ≥ 0, ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I
pˆib ≤ pi, ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I
pˆib ≥ pi −Ri(1− xib), ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I
xib ∈ {0, 1}, pi ≥ 0, pˆib ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I.
From the formulation (STM) we developed a new and stronger formulation by changing inequal-
ities (1). We call this improved formulation (I), which we present below.
(I) maximize
∑
b∈B
∑
i∈I
pˆib
subject to
∑
i∈I
xib ≤ 1, ∀b ∈ B
∑
i∈I
(vibxib − pˆib) ≥ vkb − pk, ∀k ∈ I, ∀b ∈ B
vibxib − pˆib ≥ 0, ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I
pˆib ≤ pi, ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I (2)
pˆib ≥ pi −Ri(1 − xib), ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I
xib ∈ {0, 1}, pi ≥ 0, pˆib ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I.
Also, we noticed that inequalities (2) are unnecessary, which led us to another formulation that
we call (L) (from the word loose), consisting of the omission of inequalities (2) from formulation
(I). That is, it is possible that (L) is a weaker version of (I) in terms of relaxation guarantees.
Studying formulation (L), we developed another formulation with variables x and p as defined
before and a rational vector z indexed by B that represents the profit obtained from bidder b (that
is, if bidder b receives item i then zb = pi and zb = 0 if b does not receive an item). That is, one
can view z as zb =
∑
i∈I pˆib. This formulation, which we name (P) (from the word profit), consists
of finding x, p, and z that
(P) maximize
∑
b∈B
zb
subject to
∑
i∈I
xib ≤ 1, ∀b ∈ B
∑
i∈I
vibxib − zb ≥ vkb − pk, ∀k ∈ I, ∀b ∈ B
∑
i∈I
vibxib − zb ≥ 0, ∀b ∈ B
zb ≥ pi −Ri(1− xib), ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I
xib ∈ {0, 1}, pi ≥ 0, zb ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I.
As one would expect, (P) is a weaker formulation than (L).
Finally, we present our last formulation that was developed changing the focus from the price
paid by a bidder to the utility that a bidder has. We use the following variables: x and p as
defined before and a rational vector u indexed by B that represents the utilities of the bidders. The
formulation, which we name (U) (from the word utility), consists of, finding x, p, and u that
(U) maximize
∑
i∈I
∑
b∈B
vibxib −
∑
b∈B
ub
subject to
∑
i∈I
xib ≤ 1, ∀b ∈ B
ub ≥ vib − pi, ∀i ∈ I, ∀b ∈ B
ub ≤ vibxib − pi + (1− xib)(Ri + Sb), ∀i ∈ I, ∀b ∈ B
ub ≤
∑
i∈I
vibxib, ∀b ∈ B
xib ∈ {0, 1}, pi ≥ 0, ub ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I.
For some MIP formulation (F) and a valuation v, we denote by LRF (v) the value of an optimal
solution to the linear relaxation of (F) when the instance is v. Our next result formalizes the
relaxation quality guarantees for the formulations presented in this section.
Theorem 7. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem, we have that
LRI(v) ≤ LRSTM(v) and LRI(v) ≤ LRL(v) ≤ LRP(v) ≤ LRU(v). Also, there is an instance
where LRI(v) < LRSTM(v) and LRI(v) = LRL(v) < LRP(v) < LRU(v).
We do not know if there is an instance v where LRI(v) < LRL(v).
Before presenting and discussing the experimental comparison of the these formulations, we
describe the instances generators that we used in the computational experiments.
4 Multi-Item Auctions Test Suites
In this section, we propose three new models to generate different random instances for unit-demand
auctions, each of them with a nice economic interpretation.
In these three models, we start by creating a bipartite graph where one side of the bipartition
represents the items and the other, the bidders. An edge of this graph represents that the bidder
gives a positive value to the corresponding item.
4.1 Characteristics Model
The idea is to create a graph where each item has a profile of characteristics and each bidder desires
some of these characteristics. In this way, two items that have the same profile are desired by the
same bidders, and bidders desire items that do not differ much.
It is natural that an item has a market value, and the valuations for that item (by interested
bidders) are concentrated around this value. That is, the valuations for an item should not differ
too much, and valuations that are far away from this market value are rare.
An instance of our problem, that is, a valuation matrix, will be represented by a weighted
bipartite graph as we describe in the following.
Letm be the number of items, n be the number of bidders, c be the number of the characteristics
of an item, o be the number of options for any characteristic, p be the number of options preferred
by a bidder for any characteristic, ℓ be the minimum market value of an item, h be the maximum
market value of an item, and d be the percentage of deviation used. The set of vertices is I ∪B and
the set of edges E is described below.
For every item i, we have a vector of size c (the characteristics of that item) where every entry
is in {1, . . . , o} chosen independent and uniformly at random. For every bidder b, we construct a
matrix A ∈ {0, 1}c×p where, for every row, we choose independent and uniformly at random p
positions to be set to 1 and o − p positions to be set to 0. For a bidder b and an item i, we have
that ib ∈ E if and only if the characteristics of item i coincide with the preferences of bidder b, that
is, if the characteristic k of item i has value v then Akv = 1 where A is the matrix of bidder b. See
an example of such characteristics and preferences in Fig. 2(a).
Finally, for every item i, we define p¯i as the market price of item i, chosen independent and
uniformly at random from the interval [ℓ, h]. For every ib in E, we choose vib from 1.0+N (p¯i, (p¯id)2),
where N (µ, σ2) denotes the Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. See
Fig. 2(b).
4.2 Neighborhood Model
This model selects the valuations based on a geometric relation. For this, we adapt a random process
first introduced by Gilbert [6] for generating a Random Geometric Graph.
The idea is to distribute the items and the bidders in a 1 × 1 square in Q2 and define the
valuations according to the distance between a bidder and an item.
We denote the 1×1 square in Q2 byW . A ball (in Q2) with center at position (x, y) and radius r
is denoted by Ball (x, y, r).
We are given the number of items m, the number of bidders n, and a radius r. In order to
construct the valuation matrix, we construct a graph G = (I ∪ B,E) such that |I| = m and
|B| = n. First we assign a point in W independent and uniformly at random to each item and each
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Fig. 2: Instance with two characteristics, each with three options. Each bidder wants items that
have one of two options (given by their matrices) in every characteristic. The market price of each
item was chosen from the interval [140, 190], and the percentage of deviation used was d = 10.
bidder. That is, item i and bidder b are represented in W by the points (xi, yi) and (xb, yb) in Q
2,
respectively. There is an edge ib in E if (xi, yi) ∈ Ball (xb, yb, r), that is, if the distance between i
and b is at most r.
Finally, to define the valuations, for every bidder b, we choose a multiplier kb in [1, h] where h is
given as input. If ib ∈ E, then vib = 1.0+Mkb/d(i, b) where d(i, b) denotes the (Euclidean) distance
between i and b, and M is a scaling factor also given as input.
This way, a bidder only gives a positive valuation to items sufficiently close to his location, and
the valuation decreases as the distance increases. Two bidders that are at the same distance from
an item still can evaluate it differently because they might have different k multipliers.
4.3 Popularity Model
In this model we capture the idea that a market might have popular and unpopular items.
Let m be the number of items, n be the number of bidders, e be the number of edges, Q be
the maximum quality of an item, and d be a percentage of deviation. We construct the bipartite
graph as follows. We start with the empty bipartite graph with parts I and B such that |I| = m
and |B| = n. We add edges at random (as described below) until the graph has e edges.
To add an edge, we choose a bidder uniformly at random, and choose an item biased according
to its degree. That is, an item i of current degree di has a weight of di + 1. (This process, called
Preferential Attachment, was already used in the literature by Baraba´si and Albert [2] to generate
graphs with properties that appear in the World Wide Web and in graphs that arise in biology,
such as the interactions of the brain cells.)
This way, items that are “popular”, when we are adding an edge, have a higher chance to be
chosen than “unpopular” items. The final result is a graph with a small number of items of large
degree and a large number of items of small degree.
We also use the information of the (final) degree of an item to decide on the valuations. As in the
Characteristic Model, an item i has a market price p¯i, and we choose the valuation vi,b according to
1.0+N (p¯i, (p¯id)2). But, in contrast to the Characteristic Model, we do not choose the market value
uniformly at random in an interval. For each item i, we choose a random quality qi in (0, Q] and
we define p¯i as qi/di. This way, the market price of an item increases with its quality and decreases
with its degree. That is, an item has high desirability if it is “cheap” or has good quality. See Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3: From (a) to (b), the 7th edge i3b1 was added. The bidder b1 was chosen uniformly and item i3
was chosen because of its high degree. The pair within parenthesis in (b) represents (qi, p¯i). Each qi
was randomly chosen in the interval (0, 10].
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we present some empirical results involving the formulations. In our experiments,
the new formulations produced better results than (STM), the previously known formulation from
the literature. In particular, formulation (L) was the best for small instances, and formulation (U)
was the best for large instances (providing a small gap).
We used a computer with two Intel Xeon E5620 2.40 GHz processors, 64GB of RAM running
Gentoo Linux 64bit. The MIPs were solved by CPLEX 12.1.0 in single-thread mode, with work
memory limited to 4GB. The tests were run using a time limit of one hour of CPU time.
For our tests, we generated six test sets, two for every one of our three models: one with 20
instances with 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, and 300 bidders and items (that we call “small instances”)
and other with 20 instances with 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500 and 3000 bidders and items (that we
call “large instances”). Next we describe the parameters given to the models, and we denote by n
the number of items (that is equal to the number of bidders).
For the Characteristic Model, we chose the number of options for a characteristic as o = 8,
the number of options prefered by a bidder for any characteristic as p = 7 and the number of
characteristics of an item as ⌈log(8/n)/ log(p/o)⌉, the minimum market value of an item as ℓ = 1,
the maximum market value of an item as h = 100, and the percentage of deviation as d = 0.25.
Thus, the mean degree of the bidders is between 7 and 8. For the Neighborhood Model, we chose
the maximum multiplier of a bidder as h = 3, the radius as
√
8
nπ
(in this way, the mean degree of
the bidders is near 8) and the scaling factor M = 10. Finally, for the Popularity Model, we chose
the number of edges as e = 8n, the maximum quality of an item as Q = 200, and the percentage of
deviation as d = 0.25.
Note that all of our instances are sparse, since we believe that in practice dense instances should
be rare. That is, we expect that, in a market with many items, each bidder would have positive
valuation usually only for a few items.
In our experiments, CPLEX had a better performance with formulation (L) than with any other
formulation for small instances. First of all, with (L), CPLEX solved more small instances than
with the others formulation. For example, with (STM), CPLEX could not solve (within one hour)
any instance of the Popularity Model with 150 or more items. But, with (L), CPLEX solved 14
instances with 150 items and 7 instances with 200 items.
Also, Table 2 and Fig. 5 in Appendix C shows that (STM) and (P) provided a mean final gap for
small instances that where not solved within one hour that were much worse than those provided
by (U), (I) and (L) (at least twice the gap for those formulations).
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Fig. 4: Number of solutions found by each MIP formulation. We omitted instances of size 300 of
the graphs because none of the formulations could solve them within the time limit. For more
information, one can refere to Table 1 in Appendix C.
Even thought formulation (L) was better than the others, we noticed that formulations (U) and
(I) were not so far behind from formulation (L) as one can observe in Figs. 4 (in this section) and 5
and Table 2 (in Appendix C).
For large instances, when analyzing the mean final gap for large instances, we conclude that
formulation (U) is better than the others. Actually, (U) was able to maintain a really mean small gap
even for instances with 3000 bidders and items (the mean final gap was of 2% for the Characteristics
model, 3% for the Neighborhood model and 17% for the Popularity model). Figure 6 and Table 3
in Appendix C presents this information in more detail.
We believe that this result is impressive because, theoretically (as proven in Theorem 7), (U) is
the weakest of our new formulations (we have no result that compares (U) and (STM)). None the
less, (U) is a small formulation when compared with (STM), (I) and (L) and, because of that, the
linear relaxation can be computed faster for this formulation (and also for formulation (P)) as one
can see in Fig. 7 and Table 4 in Appendix C. Because (P) is a stronger formulation than (U) and
they have the same size, we believe that formulation (U) outperformed formulation (P) because of
the heuristics used by CPLEX to find good integer solutions.
6 Hardness of Approximating Geometric Prices
The result of Briest [3] shows how hard is to solve efficiently the unit-demand envy-free pricing
problem. While pursuing a variant of the problem for which we could design a polynomial-time
algorithm or a constant approximation and inspired by [1], we considered the case where the prices
are restricted to the elements of a geometric series.
Note that this reduces drastically the space of feasible prices and that could potentially lead to
solutions far from optimal. This is not the case, as we prove below, the value of an optimal solution
of this variant is within a constant factor of the value of an optimal solution of the original problem.
Before that, we introduce some useful notation.
Definition 8. For a fixed valuation v we denote max{vib : i ∈ I, b ∈ B} by V . For a fixed positive
rational ǫ, we denote by D1+ǫ the set {d0, d1, . . .} where, for every non-negative integer k, dk =
V/(1 + ǫ)k.
Definition 9. For positive real numbers n and a set D1+ǫ, let ⌊n⌋1+ǫ = dr where r is the integer
such that dr ≤ n < dr−1.
Remember that in Sect. 2 we defined xp as an envy-free allocation for p that maximizes the
auctioneer’s profit.
Definition 10. Let sol(p) be the auctioneer’s profit for a pricing p and xp.
Now, let us first consider that ǫ = 1, that is, the prices are restricted to D2. We show that the
maximum profit achieved by a pricing restricted by D2 is at least a constant fraction of the value
of an optimal solution for the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem.
Theorem 11. For every pricing p, there exists a pricing p˜ consisting of prices only in D2 such
that sol(p˜) ≥ sol(p)/4.
Proof. We obtain p˜ by rounding down the components of the vector 2p/3. That is, p˜i =
⌊
2pi
3
⌋
2
for
every item i. First note that pi/3 < p˜i ≤ 2pi/3. Let us show that sol(p˜) ≥ sol(p)/4.
As p˜i < pi for every item i, every bidder that receives an item in xp also receives an item in
xp˜. Now, suppose that bidder b receives item i in xp and receives item k in xp˜. If p˜k ≥ p˜i, then the
profit obtained from b is at least p˜i > pi/3. So, from now on, we assume that p˜k < p˜i.
Since b receives i and not k in xp, we must have that vib − pi ≥ vkb − pk. Also, as b receives k
and not i in xp˜, we must have that vkb − p˜k ≥ vib− p˜i, which implies that pk − p˜k ≥ pi− p˜i. By the
tie-breaking rule used in the definition of xp, the inequality is in fact strict, as p˜k < p˜i.
Now, suppose that p˜k ≤ p˜i/4. As p˜i ≤ 2pi/3, we have that
pi − p˜i ≥
3p˜i
2
− p˜i =
p˜i
2
≥ 2p˜k = 3p˜k − p˜k ≥ pk − p˜k,
contradicting the fact that pk − p˜k > pi − p˜i. So p˜k > p˜i/4, but as p˜k and p˜i are prices in D2, we
conclude that p˜k ≥ p˜i/2. Hence,
p˜k ≥
p˜i
2
>
pi + p˜k − pk
2
≥
pi + p˜k − 3p˜k
2
,
and thus p˜k > pi/4. Therefore, we conclude that sol(p˜) ≥ sol(p)/4. ⊓⊔
One can prove a similar result for pricings that are restricted to D1+ǫ, for an arbitrary ǫ > 0.
The ratio achieved for such pricings with respect to the optimal value approaches 1 when ǫ goes to
0. This is stated in the next theorem, whose proof is presented in Appendix B.
Theorem 12. Let p be a pricing. For each real ǫ such that 0 < ǫ < 1, there exists a pricing p˜ǫ
consisting of only prices in D1+ǫ such that sol(p˜ǫ) goes to sol(p) as ǫ goes to 0. ⊓⊔
A consequence of this result is the following. If there exists a constant factor approximation
for the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem with prices restricted to D1+ǫ for some ǫ > 0,
then there would exist a constant factor approximation for the unrestricted problem. This is very
unlikely, as shown by Briest [3]. So, even for this variant, one cannot hope to find a constant factor
approximation without invalidating the hardness assumptions made by Briest. On the other hand,
an empirically fast algorithm for solving or approximating this variant of the problem would lead
to good approximations for the original problem.
7 Final Remarks
In this paper, we presented four new MIP formulations for the unit-demand envy-free pricing
problem along with some empirical results comparing such formulations. Our results show that our
formulations are better than the previous formulation from the literature.
Additionally, we presented a new result regarding the hardness of approximating a variant of
the problem. The fact that, restricting the prices to be chosen from a geometric series does not
make the problem easier to approximate, is really interesting and gives more evidence on how hard
it is to theoretically approach this problem.
We also presented three models for generating instances of unit-demand auctions. To our knowl-
edge, these are the first tests suites for unit-demand auctions in the literature. We made the corre-
sponding instances generators available as open-source software.
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A Proof of Theorem 7
We prove Theorem 7 using the following lemmas.
Lemma 13. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem, LRI(v) ≤ LRSTM(v).
Proof. Let (x, p, pˆ) be a feasible solution of (I). We show that (x, p, pˆ) is also feasible for (STM).
For that, we only have to prove that, for every bidder b and item k,
∑
i∈I\{k}
(vibxib − pˆib) ≥ vkb
∑
i∈I\{k}
xib − pk.
From the feasibility of (x, p, pˆ), we have that
∑
i∈I(vibxib − pˆib) ≥ vkb − pk, so we conclude that
∑
i∈I\{k}
(vibxib − pˆib) ≥ vkb − pk + vkbxkb − pˆkb ≥ vkb(1 − xkb) − pk ≥ vkb
∑
i∈I\{k}
xib − pk,
from where the result follows. ⊓⊔
Lemma 14. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem, LRI(v) ≤ LRL(v).
Proof. The result is clear since (L) has a subset of the inequalities of (I). ⊓⊔
Lemma 15. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem, LRL(v) ≤ LRP(v).
Proof. Let (x, p, pˆ) be a feasible solution of the linear relaxation of (L). We prove that (x, p, z),
where zb =
∑
i∈I pˆib, is a feasible solution of the linear relaxation of (L) with the same value as
(x, p, pˆ).
First of all, it is clear that, for every item i, we have that pi ≥ 0 and also, for every bidder b,
we have that
∑
i∈I xib ≤ 1. Finally, for every pair (i, b) in I ×B, we have that xib ≥ 0.
Also, for a bidder b, using the fact that zb =
∑
i∈I pˆib, it is easy to see that zb ≥ pi−Ri(1−xib)
(because pˆib ≥ pi −Ri(1− xib) for every item i),
∑
i∈I vibxib − zb ≥ 0 (because vibxib − pˆib ≥ 0 for
every item i) and that
∑
i∈I vibxib−zb ≥ vkb−pk for every item k, since
∑
i∈I(vibxib−pˆib) ≥ vkb−pk.
Now notice that (x, p, z) has the same value in (P) as (x, p, pˆ) has in (L). ⊓⊔
Lemma 16. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem, LRP(v) ≤ LRU(v).
Proof. Let (x, p, z) be a feasible solution of the linear relaxation of (P). We prove that (x, p, u),
where ub =
∑
i∈I vibxib−zb is a feasible solution of the linear relaxation of (U) with the same value
as (x, p, z).
Because (x, p, z) is feasible for (P), we have that
∑
i∈I xib ≤ 1 for every bidder b, pi ≥ 0 for
every item i and, for every pair (i, b) ∈ I ×B, we have that xib ≥ 0.
Since zb ≥ 0 for every bidder b, we conclude that
∑
i∈I vibxib−ub ≥ 0, and because
∑
i∈I vibxib−
zb ≥ 0, we conclude that ub ≥ 0. Also, we have that ub =
∑
i∈I vibxib − zb ≥ vkb − pk for every
item k.
Now, notice that, as Sb = max{vib : i ∈ I} and
∑
i∈I xib ≤ 1, for a bidder b and an item i,
∑
i′∈I
vi′bxi′b = vibxib +
∑
i′∈I\{i}
vi′bxi′b ≤ vibxib +
∑
i′∈I\{i}
Sbxi′b ≤ vibxib + Sb(1− xib).
From this, we conclude that
ub =
∑
i′∈I
vi′bxi′b − zb ≤ vibxib + Sb(1 − xib)− zb
≤ vibxib + Sb(1 − xib)− pi +Ri(1 − xib)
≤ vibxib − pi + (Sb +Ri)(1− xib),
proving that (x, p, u) is feasible in (U). It is easy to see that (x, p, u) has the same value in (U) as
(x, p, z) has in (P). ⊓⊔
Theorem 7. For every instance v of the unit-demand envy-free problem, LRI(v) ≤ LRSTM(v)
and LRI(v) ≤ LRL(v) ≤ LRP(v) ≤ LRU(v). Also, there is an instance where LRI(v) < LRSTM(v)
and LRI(v) = LRL(v) < LRP(v) < LRU(v).
Proof. The first part of this proof is given by Lemmas 13, 14, 15, and 16. The
second part is shown by our empirical results. All the data can be found at
https://github.com/schouery/unit-demand-market-models.
B Proof of Theorem 12
Before its proof, let us restate Theorem 12.
Theorem 12. Let p be a pricing. For each real ǫ such that 0 < ǫ < 1, there exists a pricing p˜ǫ
consisting of only prices in D1+ǫ such that sol(p˜ǫ) goes to sol(p) as ǫ goes to 0.
Proof. For every bidder i, let p˜ǫi =
⌊
pi
r
⌋
1+ǫ
, where r is a constant greater than 1 that we choose
later on. Note that pi(1+ǫ)r < p˜
ǫ
i ≤
pi
r
.
As in the proof of Theorem 11, every bidder that receives an item in xp also receives an item
in xp˜ǫ , and if bidder b exchanges item i for item k when the pricing changes to p˜
ǫ, then pk − p˜ǫk >
pi − p˜ǫi unless p˜
ǫ
k ≥ p˜
ǫ
i .
If p˜ǫk ≥ p˜
ǫ
i , then p˜
ǫ
k >
pi
(1+ǫ)r . Otherwise
p˜ǫk ≥
pk
(1 + ǫ)r
>
p˜ǫk + pi − p˜
ǫ
i
(1 + ǫ)r
≥
p˜ǫk + pi −
pi
r
(1 + ǫ)r
,
which implies that
p˜ǫk ≥
r − 1
(1 + ǫ)r2 − r
pi.
It can be shown that the maximum on the right side is achieved at r = 1+
√
ǫ√
1+ǫ
. Using this value
of r, we have that
p˜ǫk ≥
1
2
√
ǫ(1 + ǫ) + 2ǫ+ 1
pi.
As ǫ goes to 0, the chosen value of r goes to 1, and sol(p˜ǫ) goes to sol(p). ⊓⊔
C Tables and Graphics
In this section we present our empirical results.
(a) Characteristics
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
50 20 20 20 20 20
100 0 20 20 20 20
150 0 10 13 5 12
200 0 6 8 0 4
250 0 1 1 0 0
300 0 0 0 0 0
(b) Neighborhood
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
50 20 20 20 20 20
100 11 20 20 19 20
150 0 15 17 4 15
200 0 4 7 0 4
250 0 1 2 0 0
300 0 0 0 0 0
(c) Popularity
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
50 20 20 20 20 20
100 3 20 20 19 20
150 0 14 14 7 14
200 0 5 7 0 4
250 0 0 0 0 0
300 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Number of optimal solutions found for small instances in each of the models.
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Fig. 5: Mean final gap for small instances (for the three models) that were not solved within the
time limit.
(a) Characteristics
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
50 - - - - -
100 0.013 (0.00648) - - - -
150 0.0232 (0.00678) 0.0038 (0.00257) 0.00428 (0.00202) 0.00781 (0.00348) 0.00399 (0.00248)
200 0.0239 (0.00417) 0.00356 (0.00145) 0.00343 (0.000715) 0.00842 (0.00287) 0.00367 (0.00152)
250 0.0266 (0.00433) 0.00657 (0.00257) 0.00593 (0.00259) 0.0126 (0.00352) 0.00691 (0.00271)
300 0.026 (0.00439) 0.00624 (0.00243) 0.00588 (0.00245) 0.0135 (0.00344) 0.00766 (0.00257)
(b) Neighborhood
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
50 - - - - -
100 0.0112 (0.0062) - - 0.00517 (0) -
150 0.0173 (0.00646) 0.00248 (0.00247) 0.00331 (0.00021) 0.00849 (0.00416) 0.00406 (0.00168)
200 0.0204 (0.00498) 0.00409 (0.0026) 0.00435 (0.0024) 0.0125 (0.00471) 0.00569 (0.00191)
250 0.0244 (0.00636) 0.00606 (0.00351) 0.00581 (0.00357) 0.0173 (0.00422) 0.00761 (0.00375)
300 0.0279 (0.00442) 0.00869 (0.00245) 0.00841 (0.00257) 0.0217 (0.00415) 0.00994 (0.00289)
(c) Popularity
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
50 - - - - -
100 0.0289 (0.0138) - - 0.00454 (0) -
150 0.0447 (0.0151) 0.00643 (0.0024) 0.00616 (0.00355) 0.0156 (0.00801) 0.00739 (0.00362)
200 0.0501 (0.013) 0.00796 (0.00424) 0.00832 (0.00454) 0.0201 (0.00858) 0.00985 (0.00475)
250 0.0611 (0.0093) 0.0131 (0.00547) 0.012 (0.0054) 0.0297 (0.00687) 0.0146 (0.00485)
300 0.0646 (0.0132) 0.0186 (0.00749) 0.0168 (0.00708) 0.0355 (0.00864) 0.02 (0.00683)
Table 2: Mean final gap for small instances (for the three models) that were not solved within the
time limit. The value in parenthesis denotes the standard deviation.
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Fig. 6: Mean final gap for large instances (for the three models) that were not solved within the
time limit. We limited the graphic to plot only the final gaps less or equal to 1, that is, if the mean
final gap of a formulation is missing in the graphic then it was bigger than 1.
(a) Characteristics
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
500 0.036 (0.0044) 0.0114 (0.00194) 0.0107 (0.00185) 0.022 (0.00292) 0.0135 (0.00227)
1000 0.0394 (0.00478) 0.0124 (0.00184) 0.0114 (0.00127) 0.0238 (0.00162) 0.0148 (0.00121)
1500 0.0891 (0.0434) 0.0133 (0.00172) 0.0119 (0.00138) 0.0262 (0.00207) 0.0163 (0.00303)
2000 0.145 (0.0208) 0.0256 (0.0105) 0.0152 (0.00267) 0.0301 (0.00196) 0.0198 (0.00238)
2500 0.15 (0.0212) 0.0278 (0.00734) 0.0159 (0.00458) 0.0294 (0.00199) 0.0202 (0.00221)
3000 0.2 (0.0543) 0.0393 (0.0102) 0.0311 (0.00626) 0.0331 (0.00408) 0.0205 (0.00269)
(b) Neighborhood
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
500 0.031 (0.00614) 0.0124 (0.00351) 0.012 (0.00331) 0.0261 (0.00567) 0.0141 (0.00362)
1000 0.0363 (0.00388) 0.0156 (0.00195) 0.0152 (0.00189) 0.0325 (0.00305) 0.0179 (0.00212)
1500 0.0377 (0.00259) 0.017 (0.00253) 0.0163 (0.00177) 0.0344 (0.00253) 0.0191 (0.00185)
2000 ∞ 0.0375 (0.0842) 0.0177 (0.00267) 0.0519 (0.0383) 0.0203 (0.00185)
2500 ∞ 31.8 (138) 0.0183 (0.00229) 0.125 (0.195) 0.0289 (0.0306)
3000 ∞ 443 (671) 26.3 (114) 0.275 (0.218) 0.0306 (0.0114)
(c) Popularity
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
500 0.106 (0.0177) 0.0426 (0.0101) 0.032 (0.00923) 0.0554 (0.0108) 0.033 (0.0091)
1000 0.198 (0.0648) 0.091 (0.0315) 0.0782 (0.0289) 0.092 (0.059) 0.0559 (0.0156)
1500 0.267 (0.0953) 0.977 (2.46) 0.802 (2.49) 0.217 (0.128) 0.0825 (0.0461)
2000 0.455 (0.16) 2.18 (3.97) 1.32 (3.05) 0.538 (0.783) 0.0815 (0.018)
2500 0.47 (0.202) 2.86 (4.48) 3.28 (4.87) ∞ 0.151 (0.0706)
3000 0.662 (0.374) 3.59 (4.77) 2.98 (4.38) ∞ 0.177 (0.0637)
Table 3: Mean final gap for large instances (for the three models) that were not solved within the
time limit. The value in parenthesis denotes the standard deviation.
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Fig. 7: Mean time (in seconds) to solve the linear relaxation of the first node for large instances (for
the three models).
(a) Characteristics
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
500 2.72 (0.749) 1.96 (0.485) 1.06 (0.264) 0.339 (0.071) 0.128 (0.024)
1000 5.94 (1.2) 5.46 (1.23) 2.73 (0.708) 0.814 (0.227) 0.361 (0.072)
1500 13.1 (2.7) 10 (2.1) 4.71 (1.11) 1.68 (0.422) 0.588 (0.148)
2000 23.6 (4.03) 17.3 (3.65) 9.01 (1.9) 2.37 (0.709) 1.11 (0.22)
2500 34.1 (10.7) 22.8 (3.04) 11.6 (2.29) 3.75 (0.865) 1.58 (0.351)
3000 62.8 (22.5) 33.8 (8.34) 17.7 (3.09) 5.78 (1.54) 2.1 (0.512)
(b) Neighborhood
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
500 2.15 (0.511) 1.59 (0.345) 0.969 (0.245) 0.42 (0.0757) 0.175 (0.0389)
1000 6.34 (1.72) 5.4 (1.38) 2.94 (0.737) 1.25 (0.241) 0.501 (0.0883)
1500 13.8 (3.16) 10.4 (2.32) 6 (1.04) 2.45 (0.697) 0.897 (0.18)
2000 25.2 (5) 18.5 (3.93) 10.8 (1.88) 3.85 (0.907) 1.47 (0.304)
2500 31.9 (6.79) 25.5 (4.42) 14.8 (2.73) 6.86 (1.03) 1.86 (0.531)
3000 42.9 (8.13) 33.2 (6.77) 18.3 (3.38) 8.8 (1.9) 2.72 (0.549)
(c) Popularity
|I | (STM) (I) (L) (P) (U)
500 2.3 (0.589) 2.69 (0.662) 1.43 (0.231) 0.412 (0.0788) 0.143 (0.0341)
1000 8.78 (3.1) 7.18 (2.18) 4.49 (0.667) 1.2 (0.242) 0.409 (0.0731)
1500 25.4 (15.3) 32.4 (43.2) 8.06 (2.43) 2.34 (0.615) 0.799 (0.17)
2000 40.4 (24.6) 57.3 (126) 12.5 (3.25) 3.76 (1.13) 1.35 (0.332)
2500 74.4 (51.2) 129 (262) 24.4 (10.8) 5.21 (1.22) 1.99 (0.48)
3000 92.2 (59) 250 (389) 37.2 (19.4) 7.17 (2.22) 2.8 (0.756)
Table 4: Mean time (in seconds) to solve the linear relaxation of the first node for large instances
(for the three models). The value in parenthesis denotes the standard deviation.
